The impact of a cartel (a combination of firms, states, or groups whose purpose is to restrict output and increase profits) can best be described by contrasting its profit-maximizing operations with those of firms in a competitive industry. Every cartel or competitive firm produces at the rate of output that maximizes its profits. However, given market demands and cost structures, the rate of output consistent with profit maximization will differ between firms organized into a cartel and those in a competitive industry. These different rates of output imply different prices. In a competitive industry, output and price levels are determined by the intersection of the industry demand and supply curves. The demand curve indicates the varying amounts of a commodity that buyers will purchase at each price, while the supply curve indicates the varying amounts of a commodity that sellers will supply at each price. At the point where these curves intersect, competitive producers will supply the quantity of a good that consumers wish to purchase at that price; any firm that attempts to raise its price by producing less will simply lose sales to other finns in the industry.
If the firms form a cartel, however, they can influence market price in their favor by restricting output.
tm The OPEC cartel may not meet the strict definition of a cartel in all respects, but this term is used to facilitate discussion. An alternative analysis, not pursued here, would treat OPEC as the dominant finn that sets and lets the small producers sell all they want at that price.
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The profit-maximizing rate of output will thus be less and the price higher than would prevail in a competitive industry.
Cartels Are Typically Unstable
A cartel, however, is unlikely to survive imless its rules are enforced by government sanction. Historically, cartels have been fragile, lasting only a short time. Unless all producers in the industry are members of the cartel, the higher price of the good caused by the cartel's restriction of output provides a great incentive for nonmembers to increase their own output. 4
Moreover, firms have a powerful incentive not to join the cartel. The higher price resulting from the restrictions on output by the cartel will increase nonmembers' profits even more since they can expand their rates of output. Consequently, each potential member of the cartel faces essentially the same incentive not to join, and actual cartel members will find their share of the market and profits reduced as nonmembers increase their production and sales.
The length of time that a cartel can survive depends in part on the elasticity of the supply curve of the industry's output. The less elastic the supply curve, the longer the cartel is likely to survive. If a large increase in price elicits only a small increase in output by non-cartel firms, there will be less pressure on the cartel.
Likewise, the more inelastic the demand curve for the cartel's product, the higher the price can be raised without drastically reducing the quantity demanded and the greater the potential cartel profit. If good substitutes are available for the cartel's product, however, this will not occur; sizable increases in the price of the cartel's product will result in larger purchases of these substitute goods. In this case, the cartel is unlikely to increase its profits for long by restricting •output and raising prices.
Although both the demand and supply relationships may appear to be quite inelastic in the short run, demand and supply conditions will change over time in response to higher prices. These changes will reduce the stability of the cartel. First, over time, substitutes will always be found for the cartel's product. As the price of petroleum rises, people learn how to substitute other goods (e.g., coal, alcohol, nuclear energy, etc.) as sources of energy. Furthermore, greater economies in the use of a good, which also reduce the quantity of the good demanded, can be achieved over the long run. For example, the increased use of smaller automobiles and insulation have reduced the quantity of petroleum demanded for gasoline and heating. Consequently, the quantity demanded decreases more drastically over time.
Second, new techniques of production, new discoveries and new investments will increase the quantity of the cartel's product (e.g., petroleum) supplied by others.
if the cartel is initially successful in raising prices sufficiently to increase profits, rivalry will arise between the cartel members over how the reduced output and the increased profits are to be allocated. Each member will want to sell more as the price is increased through general production restrictions -that is, each member has an incentive to cheat on the cartels sales quotas. Intense rivalry for greater market shares will develop among cartel members. Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for cartels to exist for extended periods.
OPEC Not Immune from Pressures
The OPEC cartel has not been immune to these pressures. It is presently in the throes of relatively severe adjustments in output in response to market forces. It has already lost much of its international market to non-OPEC suppliers as shown in table 1. OPEC countries produced an increasing portion of the world's petroleum output until 1973, at which time they accounted for 55.5 percent of the total, up from 52.6 percent in 1972, 48.3 percent in 1970 and 37.6 percent in 1960 . Their annual rate of production rose in excess of 8 percent per year through 1974, well above that of non-OPEC countries. Following the first major price increase in late 1973, total OPEC output dropped somewhat for two years and then rose moderately through 1977. Then, from 1977 to 1979 its output declined somewhat. Since late 1979, following the latest round of major price increases, OPEC's output has declined rapidly, dropping about 22 percent in the latest 12 months. Its share of the market, which totaled 55.5 percent in 1973, declined slowly to 49.6 percent in 1979. The decline has recently accelerated: OPEC's market share dropped to 44 percent by September 1980.
Higher oil prices have induced the non-OPEC world to increase output. Output in non-OPEC nations rose from 24.9 million barrels per day in 1977 to 32M mil- The profits accruing to OPFC were enhanced and extended
Emirates in 1979.6 Such differences engender conflicts over a longer period of time than they might othe,wi e hn~-e been by ill ad ised U.S. policu s. In~ittempting to cushion the . -impact of the sharply higher OPEC prices on the domestic sumption to the higher oil price reduced the incentive for conomy, the U.S. government has uhjected the oil industry dome tic production and led to great r rehanc on imports, to varying degrees of price controls the last of hich were thereby enhancing OPEC's ability to influence prices For a lifted only thi year. The industry was then sñbject d to an further discus ion of this topic, see Hans H. Helbling and excess" profits tax which will contnue to retard its inc nlames E. Turley 'Oil Price Controls: A Counterproductive tive to explore and develop petroleum.
Effort," this Review (November 1975) pp. 2-6. These controls delayed the adjustment of domestic conOMiddle East Oil p. 39. about how additional reductions are to be shared. In addition, non-OPEC, producer/exporters like Mexico and Norway can obtain the existing high world price without resorting to output reduction. The OPEC cartel will face future problems in maintaining profit as the United States and other nations eliminate price and marketing controls in the oil industry.
WHY OPEC HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL FOR SO LONG
OPEC's actions have led to a rapid rise in petroleum prices and revenues for all oil producers, both OPEC and non-OPEC. From 1973 to 1979, receipts from petroleum sales by Middle East governments rose about tenfold.
7 Hence, OPEC has clearly succeeded in achieving its main objective.
An analysis of the supply of and demand for petroleum in the non-OPEC nations shows why OPEC has been so successful. First, there has been only a small increase in petroleum output by non-OPEC members following the sharply higher prices in 1973, indicating that supply of petroleum in non-OPEC nations is relatively price inelastic. Although, the price of petroleum has increased about twelvefold during this period, petroleum output in non-OPEC nations has increased only 24 percent.
8 It is estimated that the longrun price elasticity of the non-OPEC oil supply is between .33 and .67. In other words, a 1 percent increase in price of oil will cause output to increase about .5 percent?
Part of the reason for the short-run inelastic supply of petroleum by non-OPEC nations is the dominant position of OPEC in the petroleum industry. From 1945 to 1979, about three-fourths of world oil discoveries were in the Middle East (largely the OPEC area) .~°In 1973, when OPEC began restricting production, it was producing about 31 million barrels of (table 2) . Also, petroleum demand by non-OPEC nations is clearly price inelastic, at least in the short run. The large increase in price has resulted in a relatively small decrease in quantity demanded as confirmed by petroleum consumption in the major free-world industrialized countries from 1973 until mid-1980. Although petroleum prices have risen about twelvefold, consumption in these nations has declined only 10 percent, from 34.2 to 31.1 million barrels per day.
1 '
Not surprisingly, most of the more developed nations are highly dependent on imports for their supply of petroleum. Western Europe, for example, produced only 12 to 14 percent of its domestic consumption. South Mrica and Japan imported essentially all of their petroleum (table 3) . Even the United States, one of the world's largest petroleum-producing nations, imported more than 50 percent of its petroleum. Furthermore, most of the less-developed, non-OPEC nations depend largely on imports for petroleum supplies. Thirty-seven of these nations produced an average of only 12 percent of their consumption. Among the non-OPEC nations, only Egypt, Syria and Mexico have sizable quantities of petroleum exports, and the combined exports of these countries totaled less than 10 percent of U.S. imports in 1978. Given OPEC's predominant position and the length of time required for the exploration and development of petroleum resources or substitutes for petroleum, the slow response of output by the non-OPEC world to the higher price of oil is to be expected. Hence, OPEC's ability to increase profits by restricting output is not surprising.
WHY A U.S. GRAIN CARTEL WOULD FAIL
The U.S. grain industry does not possess the attributes necessary for a strong cartel. Both the world demand for and supply of U.S. grain are relatively elastic. On the demand side, the price elasticity of foreign demand for U.S. output of food and feed has been estimated to be -1.9 in the intermediate ruñ iMonthly Energy Review (December 1980), p. 90. These data overstate the inelasticity of petroleum demand at any one point in time since demand has been increasing (the demand curve was shifting to the right) -Another factor contributing to the relatively high rate of oil consumption has been the price controls which assured gasoline to U.S. and Canadian consumers at less than world prices. 1 percent increase in price, crop output would rise used since 1933 to raise farm prices and increase reabout 1.5 percent in the long run. 14 turns to U.S. farmers for a number of major exported crops, such as wheat, cotton, tobacco and rice. These Given the elastic erriort demand for and an elastic -. .
programs were successful in increasing farm profits world supply of gram in the long run, the effectivefor a few years. The higher price of these commodities ness of a U.S-enforced gram cartel in increasing urofits -increased profits to the U.S farm producers and forto U.S. farmers or to the nation for more than a year eign producers, and food prices to U.S. and foreign or two is unhkely. In the longer run of four to five consumers. However, these farm production control years, such a cartel would be disastrous.
and 
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hon had risen slightly during the 10 years prior to the adoption of these programs for cotton in 1933 (table  4) . Following the adoption of the cotton program, the United States became the residual supplier of cotton (as OPEC has become the residual supplier of oil) -Other cotton-exporting nations such as Mexico, Peru and Egypt sold all of their cotton output at the higher world prices, while the United States exported the remainder of world imports. The higher world cotton price predictably induced other nations to increase cotton production and induced consumers to increase their use of cotton substitutes such as rayon and other synthetic fibers.
The higher price likewise induced U.S. growers to increase domestic cotton production. Production controls were necessary to limit output to domestic consumption and export levels at the fixed prices. As a result of this program, the U.S. share of world cotton production declined steadily, dropping from 56 per- 7 The stated purpose of the agreement was to stabilize the price and quantity of wheat in international trade. Originally, each exporter was to furnish a specific quantity of wheat for export and each importer to purchase a specific quantity. The organization soon evolved into a cartel with the United States and Canada as the price leaders. The United States supplied the residual wheat demanded at the specified price. The cartel broke down in 1964, when the United States decided to regain the Japanese market captured earlier by the Canadians. Although U.S. production controls and price supports to farmers were maintained, the breakdown of the cartel and a reduclion of U.S. wheat prices were quickly followed by accelerating U.S. wheat exports. U.S. wheat exports through commercial channels had averaged 141. bushels, only 9 percent of world wheat exports. By 1970, such exports had risen to 508.0 million bushels or 26 percent of world wheat exports.' 8
A grain cartel composed of a number of the major grain-producing nations might increase profits from grain exports for a somewhat longer period than the U.S. could acting alone. However, within a few years, demand for the cartel-produced grain would become more elastic, profit from grain sales by the cartel would decline sharply and the problem of allocating production among the nations would become more intense.
-. the Potential for Punishing OPEC Nations Is Limited.,.
A U.S-sponsored grain cartel will not succeed in punishing OPEC because there is a relatively small demand for grain imports in most OPEC nations. Incomes in some OPEC nations are sufficient to purchase large quantities of grain. Most OPEC members, however, have relatively small populations and/or small per capita incomes and, hence, relatively small demand for grain; those with large populations such as Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and Nigeria have relatively small incomes per capita, and grain demand is relatively small because of low income (table 5) of 9.3 million and an income per capita of $6,089 has both a relatively large population and high income per capita; \ enezuela with a 14.5 m'llion opulation is likewise not far b hind Western European ations with per capita inco e of $2 772. ommercial demand fo~'mported grain by th group is a relatively small portion of the wo Id total. n 1978, the 0 EC nations consumed o y 59 milli et ic tons of grain less than one-thiS of .8. cos mp ion, and they p oduced almost three-fou hs of air consumptio domestically, imporf g on y a out 6 illio metnc tons. A this 1ev 1 of imports t e ap oxi ate grain price t at a a el ould a e to rg~n r~t ffsetth ealthtancf rsa hie ed 20 by OPEC would be astronomical. U.S. petroleum finports from the OPEC nations totaled about 1.6 billion barrels lii 1980, which cost about $34 per barrel and totaled about $54.4 billion. In 1973, prior to the cartel, imports from OPEC totaled about 1.1 billion barrels, which at $2 per barrel totaled $2.2 billion. Excluding the impact of inflation, the cartel gained $52.2 billion in revenue from its petroleum sales to the United States alone.
In early 1973; a bushel of wheat and a barrel of petroleum were selling for about the same price ($2); hence, if a food cartel attempted to maintain this relationship, it would require a wheat price from the OPEC nations of about $34 per bushel or about eight times the January 1981 average of $4.21. The 16 million metric tons of grain imports (588 million bushels) by OPEC (assuming it was all wheat and all supplied by the United States) totaled only $1.2 billion in revenue at the $2 per bushel price. Even at $34 per bushel and with no change in bushels purchased, revenues would total only $20.0 billion. Thus, the gains from the grain cartel ($20.0 billion -$1.2 billion) of $18.8 billion would still be less than two-fifths of the OPEC revenue gains of $52.2 billion ($54.4 billion -$2.2 billion). To offset this level of OPEC gains would require a wheat price in excess of $100 per bushel. 
And a U~S.Grain Cartel Would Cause Famine in Sonic Nations
One factor generally ignored in a discussion of an anti-OPEC grain cartel is its impact on the well-being of the non-OPEC world, especially the less-developed areas. As this nation has recently discovered with its Russian grain embargo, it would be futile to attempt to sell grain only to the OPEC nations at cartel prices. If a U.S.-sponsored grain cartel sold grain at lower prices to non-OPEC areas, the OPEC group would buy the grain from these other nations at a lower There are only two ways to deal with this problem. One way is to have a grain cartel consisting of all non-OPEC nations of the world. But just as with the oil cartel, every nation, especially the less-developed ones heavily affected by OPEC price increases, would have a tremendous incentive to remain outside the cartel. They could then sell the OPEC nations all their wheat at a price slightly below the carters price. The other possibility of a successful grain cartel, even in the short run, is for a few nations to somehow limit total world exports. This policy would cause starvation and famine in many non-OPEC nations. Although OPEC has largely ignored its impact on the well-being of non-OPEC nations, this is not an acceptable political possibility for the United States.
SUMMARY
Forming a grain cartel to retaliate against OPEC's oil cartel would be ineffective. The OPEC cartel has been successful because of special supply and demand conditions for petroleum, which assured an increase in profits to cartel members when production was restricted.
A grain cartel composed of the United States alone APRIL 1981 or the United States and a few other leading foodexporting nations would not succeed. Although it might raise world grain prices and increase profits to the cartel members for a year or two, the higher prices would soon lead to increased production in the rest of the world and sharp reductions in the quantity of grain exported by the cartel members. Hence, revenue to the cartel would soon decline to less than precartel levels.
Moreover, the United States and other nations have had unfavorable experience with cartel-type farm export programs. Attempts to maintain cotton prices at artificially high levels after 1932 resulted in reduced exports as the United States became the residual supplier, while other producing nations profited from our production control and price support programs. Similarly, the International Wheat Agreement collapsed under increased competition by member nations.
Another factor limiting the ability of a food cartel to punish OPEC is that a food cartel cannot be effective without doing great injury to people in less-developed nations. Attempts to provide less-developed, non-OPEC nations with food on more favorable terms than the rest of the world would result in reshipment to OPEC members, thereby nullifying the objectives of the cartel. A food cartel would, thus, reduce food supplies for the near destitute masses of people in the less-developed nations.
